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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This case comes before this court on Fahim Sabir's 
appeal from the sentence the district court imposed on him 
after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more 
than 100 grams of heroin contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Sabir entered the plea 
pursuant to a plea agreement which stipulated that he had 
demonstrated affirmative acceptance of responsibility 
entitling him to a 3-level decrease in his offense level 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 ("section 3E1.1"). At the 
sentencing, after the court awarded Sabir the 3-level 
decrease, it calculated his total offense level at 23 which, 
when applied to his criminal history category of I, yielded a 
sentencing range of 46 to 57 months under the sentencing 
guidelines. Nevertheless, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) 
established a mandatory minimum sentence of five years 
for the offense so that ordinarily the sentencing range 
would not have been material to his sentence. 
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Sabir, however, urged at his sentencing that the court 
should sentence him under the guidelines without regard 
for the statutory minimum sentence, pursuant to the safety 
valve provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), adopted in 1994 as 
a portion of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 80001, 
108 Stat. 1796, 1985-86. The safety valve provisions have 
been incorporated verbatim into the sentencing guidelines 
as U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, but as a matter of convenience we will 
refer only to the statutory citations. The safety valve 
provisions establish that a defendant shall be sentenced 
pursuant to the sentencing guidelines without regard to 
any statutory minimum sentence in certain drug offense 
cases in the event that the following five conditions are met: 
 
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal 
history point, as determined under the sentencing 
guidelines; 
 
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible 
threats of violence or possess a firearm or other 
dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do 
so) in connection with the offense; 
 
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious 
bodily injury to any person; 
 
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, 
manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as 
determined under the sentencing guidelines and was 
not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as 
defined in 21 U.S.C. 848; and 
 
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, 
the defendant has truthfully provided to the 
Government all information and evidence the defendant 
has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of 
the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or 
plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or 
useful other information to provide or that the 
Government is already aware of the information shall 
not preclude a determination by the court that the 
defendant has complied with this requirement. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Not surprisingly, most of the disputes 
in the reported cases involving the safety valve provisions 
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center on the fifth condition, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) ("section 
3553(f)(5)"), which requires the defendant truthfully to 
provide certain information to the government. The 
government does not claim that Sabir's offense could not 
qualify for disposition under the safety value provisions if 
the five statutory conditions are satisfied. 
 
The district court rejected Sabir's claim that the safety 
valve provisions were applicable: 
 
The final criteria is that not later than the time of the 
sentencing hearing the defendant has truthfully 
provided to the government all information and 
evidence he has concerning the offense or offenses that 
were part of the same course of conduct or of a 
common scheme or plan. 
 
Defendant does not meet this criteria. According to 
the government the defendant gave two proffers, and in 
each he minimized his role. To this day of sentencing 
he continues to minimize his role and fails to give a full 
forthright account of his activities either to the 
Probation Department or to the government. Therefore 
he's not entitled to the benefit of either the safety valve 
or the resulting two level downward adjustment.1 
 
Supp. app. at 15-16. Thus, the court sentenced Sabir to 60 
months in prison followed by a four-year term of supervised 





On this appeal Sabir makes two contentions. First, he 
contends "that if one is sufficiently candid to get acceptance 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We are not completely clear as to what the district court meant when 
it indicated that Sabir was not entitled to the benefit of "the resulting 
two level downward adjustment." The safety valve provisions do not 
provide for a downward adjustment in the offense level but the court did 
allow Sabir a 2-level downward adjustment in his offense level for 
acceptance of responsibility under section 3E1.1(a). Probably the court 
was referring to the fact that at the sentencing it already had denied 
Sabir a 2-level decrease in his offense level which Sabir sought under 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) for being a minor participant in the criminal activity. 
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of responsibility, it is contradictory to say that he 
minimized his role." Br. at 9. Thus, in his view, the court's 
finding that he accepted responsibility should entitle him to 
the benefit of the safety valve provisions, but the court 
denied him that advantage because it found he minimized 
his role in the offense. Second, he contends that he 
complied with section 3553(f)(5) which required him to 
provide the government with "all information and evidence 
[he] has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of 
the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or 
plan." We exercise plenary review over Sabir's first 
contention as we regard it as raising a legal question, but 
we can reject the court's findings that Sabir did not provide 
the information and evidence only if we conclude that the 
findings were clearly erroneous. See United States v. 
Wilson, 106 F.3d 1140, 1142-43 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
Section 3E1.1 provides for a decrease in the offense level 
on the basis of the defendant's acceptance of responsibility: 
 
(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance 
of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense 
level by 2 levels. 
 
(b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under 
subsection (a), the offense level determined prior to the 
operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and 
the defendant has assisted authorities in the 
investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by 
taking one or more of the following steps: 
 
(1) timely providing complete information to the 
government concerning his own involvement in the 
offense; or 
 
(2) timely notifying authorities of his intention to 
enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the 
government to avoid preparing for trial and 
permitting the court to allocate its resources 
efficiently, 
 
decrease the offense level by 1 additional level. 
 
We do not doubt that frequently a defendant entitled to 
a 2- or 3-level reduction in his offense level by reason of 
acceptance of responsibility will be entitled to the benefit of 
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the safety valve provisions as well so that he or she will be 
sentenced under the guidelines without regard for any 
statutory minimum sentence. Yet the acceptance of 
responsibility provisions in the guidelines plainly do not 
subsume all of a defendant's responsibilities under the 
safety valve provisions. In United States v. Arrington, 73 
F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1996), the district court determined that 
the defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the safety 
valve provisions because he did not satisfy section 
3553(f)(5), even though the court allowed him a 2-level 
reduction in his offense level under section 3E1.1(a) for 
acceptance of responsibility and a 1-level reduction under 
section 3E1.1(b)(2) for entering a timely plea of guilty. On 
appeal the defendant argued "that it is inconsistent to hold 
that he truthfully admitted his offense conduct under 
§ 3E1.1(a) but did not truthfully provide all the information 
concerning his offense under § 3553(f)(5)." Arrington, 73 
F.3d at 149. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
rejected that contention: 
 
We agree with the district court that the admission of 
responsibility necessary to obtain a reduction under 
§ 3E1.1(a) is not necessarily sufficient to satisfy 
§ 3553(f)(5). Section 3553(f)(5) requires more 
cooperation than § 3E1.1(a): § 3553(f)(5) requires the 
defendant to provide `all information . . . concerning the 
offense or offenses that were part of the same course of 
conduct or of a common scheme or plan,' whereas 
§ 3E1.1(a) requires that he admit `the conduct 
comprising the offense(s) of conviction.' The distinction 
between the two is not insignificant. Although 
§ 3E1.1(a) forbids a defendant from falsely denying 
relevant conduct, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. 
(n.1(a)), it imposes no duty on a defendant to volunteer 
any information aside from the conduct comprising the 
elements of the offense. Id. In contrast, § 3553(f) states 
that a defendant must disclose `all information' 
concerning the course of conduct--not simply the facts 
that form the basis for the criminal charge. 
Accordingly, the district court correctly held that 
§ 3553(f)(5) requires more than § 3E1.1(a). 
 
Arrington, 73 F.3d at 149. 
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Arrington does not stand alone in the foregoing holding. 
In United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119 (6th Cir. 1996), the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected an argument 
similar to that the appellant advanced in Arrington, holding 
as follows: 
 
The defendant did not carry his burden of proving 
that he was eligible for sentencing below the prescribed 
mandatory minimum. The requirement of U.S.S.G. 
§ 5C1.2 that a defendant provide the government `all 
information and evidence the defendant has concerning 
the offense or offenses that were part of the same 
course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan' is 
greater than the requirement for an acceptance of 
responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. 
Application Note 1 to § 3E1.1 states that a defendant is 
not required to volunteer, or affirmatively admit, 
relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction in 
order to obtain a two-level reduction. To qualify under 
§ 5C1.2, however, a defendant must truthfully provide 
all information he has concerning the offense of 
conviction and all relevant conduct. United States v. 
Long, 77 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 1996); Application Note 3 
to § 5C1.2. Thus, the fact that the defendant qualified 
for a two-level acceptance of responsibility reduction 
under § 3E1.1 does not establish eligibility for a safety 
valve reduction under § 5C1.2. United States v. 
Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 149 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 
Adu, 82 F.3d at 124. See also United States v. Ivester, 75 
F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir.) ("Section 3553(f)(5) requires more 
than accepting responsibility for one's own acts."), cert. 
denied, 116 S.Ct. 2537 (1996). 
 
We agree with the holdings in Arrington and Adu that the 
mere fact that a defendant is entitled to a 2- or 3-level 
reduction in his offense level for acceptance of 
responsibility does not establish that the defendant has 
satisfied the requirements of section 3553(f)(5). Section 
3553(f) and section 3E1.1 are not coterminus. For example, 
whereas section 3E1.1 focuses on the defendant's 
acceptance of individual responsibility, section 3553(f) 
requires the defendant to reveal a broader scope of 
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information about the relevant criminal conduct to the 
authorities. 
 
However, we find questionable the language in Adu 
describing the requirements of section 3553(f)(5) as"greater 
than the requirement for an acceptance of responsibility 
reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1." Adu, 82 F.3d 124. Our 
questioning of Adu is based on the potential implications of 
the word "greater" on the relationship between section 
3553(f)(5) and section 3E1.1. After all, the safety valve and 
acceptance of responsibility provisions have different 
elements, so that the acceptance of responsibility provision 
is not a lesser-included requirement of the safety valve 
provisions. See United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 
939-40 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant need not 
satisfy requirements of section 3E1.1 to be eligible for relief 
under section 3553(f)); United States v. Acosta-Olivas, 71 
F.3d 375, 379 (10th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing differences 
between section 3553(f)(5) and section 3E1.1). Indeed, the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently has 
clarified that Arrington did not hold that a finding that the 
safety valve provisions of section 3553(f) apply also means 
the defendant has complied with the acceptance of 
responsibility provisions of section 3E.1.1. United States v. 
Webb, 110 F.3d 444, 447 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Arrington does 
not imply that every defendant who receives a § 5C1.2 (or a 
§ 3553(f)) reduction must receive a § 3E1.1(a) reduction. 
Section 5C1.2(5) in one respect demands more of an effort 
from the defendant than § 3E1.1(a) . . . but in other 
respects may demand less."). Consequently, we do not hold 
that a defendant entitled to the benefit of the safety valve 
provisions necessarily is entitled to a reduction in his or 
her offense level for acceptance of responsibilty. Indeed, 
that issue is not even before us. Yet our possible 
disagreement with Adu on this issue does not undermine 
the usefulness of that case on the point for which we cite 
it, i.e., that the mere fact that a defendant is entitled to a 
reduction of his offense level by reason of his acceptance of 
responsibility does not establish that he has satisfied the 
requirements of section 3553(f)(5). 
 
We also reject Sabir's contention that he was entitled to 
the benefit of the safety valve provisions because he in fact 
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complied with section 3553(f)(5). Sabir, of course, had the 
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the safety valve provisions were applicable to his case. See 
United States v. Ramirez, 94 F.3d 1095, 1100-02 (7th Cir. 
1996). The district court pointed out that Sabir minimized 
his role in the offense and to the day of the sentencing 
failed to give a "full forthright account of his activities either 
to the Probation Department or to the government." This 
finding was not clearly erroneous. In the circumstances, we 
hold, exercising plenary review, that Sabir did not 
"truthfully provide[ ] to the Government all information and 
evidence" he had concerning the offense. After all, he surely 
knew his own role in the offense, yet he did not disclose it 
completely. 
 
In rejecting Sabir's second contention, we have not lost 
sight of his argument that he cannot have minimized his 
role in the offense, as the court found that he had accepted 
responsibility and thus was entitled to the 2-level decrease 
in his offense level under section 3E1.1(a). While there is a 
certain logic in this argument, in view of the specific nature 
of the court's finding that Sabir minimized his role in the 
offense, acceptance of the argument that the court's 
findings under section 3E1.1(a) and section 3553(f)(5) were 
inconsistent so that both could not stand, rather than 
leading to an application of the safety valve provisions, 
would lead to a denial of a downward adjustment in his 
offense level for acceptance of responsibility. We, however, 
will not consider that possibility further as the government 
has not challenged the court's allowance of the downward 
adjustment of the offense level.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Actually, Sabir may have been treated more leniently than the facts 
warranted when the court sentenced him to a 60-month custodial term. 
Denial of a 2-level decrease in his offense level under section 3E1.1(a) 
also would have denied him the 1-level decrease under section 3E1.1(b), 
thus leading to a total offense level of 26 and a guidelines range of 63 
to 78 months. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
In view of the aforesaid, we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction and sentence of September 4, 1996. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
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